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Guest Editorial
Asian Corporate Governance or Corporate
Governance in Asia?
Shaomin Li* and Anil Nair*
C orporate governance has become an important issue forChinese and Indian firms as they increasingly interact
with regulators and investors from developed markets. For
instance, tapping into global capital markets to raise funds
to finance their domestic and international growth requires
firms from China and India to demonstrate strong corporate
governance credentials, so that investors do not discount
their stock (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny,
2000). The swift action of Chinese and Indian authorities in
response to recent corporate scandals – such as the one at
Satyam Computers – reveals that even governments in
emerging countries such as China and India see the need to
promote good corporate governance to ensure the inflow of
capital and the outflow of products. Furthermore, under-
standing corporate governance standards and issues in
China and India is also important to executives of foreign
multinationals doing business in these two countries.
As concerns about corporate governance gains ascen-
dancy in corporate board rooms and offices of policy
makers, business scholars’ interest in these issues have also
grown significantly, as evidenced by the number of publica-
tions on the topic (e.g., Rajagopalan & Zhang, 2008). It is this
growing importance of corporate governance to the next
phase of development of the Chinese and Indian economies
that inspired William Q. Judge, Editor-in-Chief, and us to
put together a conference and special issue on the topic for
this journal.
THE CONFERENCE
We were pleased when Corporate Governance: An Interna-
tional Review’s publisher, Wiley-Blackwell, and Old Domin-
ion University agreed to co-sponsor the conference. Little
did we realize that sponsorship was only a small part of the
challenges that were involved in organizing the conference.
As we started putting together the conference there were
many discussions, decisions, debates, and details that had to
be resolved. First, we had to decide on the scope of issues
to be presented at the conference. Next, given the fact that
corporate governance is a multidisciplinary field, we had to
ensure that the conference announcement reached all schol-
ars who were involved in research on corporate governance
in China and India – not just those in management or
finance. Responding promptly to queries that started
pouring in from all over the world became a daily routine.
Of course, reviewing the nearly 200 submissions that made it
through the conference submission deadline, and narrowing
it down to the 90 that could be accommodated in the two day
conference was not easy either. However, we knew that the
topic and the timing were on target given this better than
expected response to our call for papers.
Once the papers to be presented were accepted, tasks such
as coordinating the program; obtaining visas for interna-
tional scholars; working out conference venue details;
arranging airport pickups; developing the keynote speak-
er’s itinerary; obtaining the obligatory conference bag,
receipts, and name tags; and selecting items on the lunch
menu, became possible only because we were ably assisted
by the Managing Editor Maureen Muller and students in the
Ph.D. program in Finance, Marketing, and Strategic Man-
agement at Old Dominion University. We would especially
like to thank the following students for their dedicated hard
work without which the conference would not have been
possible: Lee Brown, Jie Chen, Gulfem Kutlu, Sarah Mady, El
Rustambekov, Denise Streeter, Joe Trendowski, Weichu Xu,
Liu Wang, Judy Wu, and Maya Zhang. We would also like to
thank our colleagues in the Management Department and
the college, especially Professor David Selover from the Eco-
nomics Department and Dean Nancy Bagranoff, for their
support and suggestions.
On October 27, 2008, over 90 corporate governance schol-
ars from 13 countries gathered in Virginia Beach to hear Anil
Gupta start off the conference with a keynote talk on corpo-
rate governance in India. His talk was bookended by Minxin
Pei’s keynote talk on corporate governance in China on
October 28. The two keynote talks indentified broad themes
and identified the many challenges that lay ahead for cor-
porate governance in China and India; the talks also set the
tone for the discussions at the conference. Scholars spent
the two days presenting papers and engaging in intense
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discussions and debates about the many facets of cor-
porate governance in China and India. The presenters
provided many insights on the issues based on their unique
expertise, which covered a wide range of disciplines –
accounting, consulting, economics, ethics, finance, law, and
management.
This special issue is a product of the discussions and
debates at the gathering. More than 50 excellent papers from
the conference were subsequently submitted to the special
issue and went through a double-blind review process.
While we were very impressed by the breadth and depth of
these papers and feel that many of them deserve publication,
due to space limitations, the reviewers and editors struggled
very hard to select seven from this large pool of very prom-
ising articles to be included in this special issue.
RESEARCH IN CG IN CHINA AND INDIA
Lurking in the background of academic research on emerg-
ing countries and markets is one key question: whether
existing theories – which were developed within the context
of mature economies – were still relevant. Thus, an underly-
ing theme that many papers are grappling with in this
special issue is whether existing theories of corporate gov-
ernance are applicable in explaining corporate governance
in these two largest economies in Asia.
Scholars who disagree that Asia needs uniquely Asian
corporate governance theories would argue that by defini-
tion, a theory should be generalizable to different observa-
tions across countries (e.g., Cheng, 1994). There may be
variations in how a theory is implemented in different set-
tings but a theory such as agency theory or institutional
theory should be universal. Thus, it is possible for research
from a wide variety of settings to build on prior research and
extend the theories and our understanding of corporate gov-
ernance. As such, a call for uniquely Asian theories may not
be warranted.
In contrast, some scholars argue that the cultural distinc-
tiveness of Asian and emerging economies call for entirely
new theories that are built from the bottom up (e.g., Hofst-
ede, 1993; Meyer, 2006). When China opened up its economy
some Chinese scholars believed that China is different from
the West, and thus needs to invent its own theories. Some
even went so far to propose the establishment of a “Beijing
Economics.” In responding to such a call, some economists
tried to clarify whether there are Chinese economics or
Beijing economics.
Qian (2002) laid out a framework to assess this issue. He
argued that a well-established discipline should have three
commonly recognized dimensions: perspective (i.e., funda-
mental assumptions); reference (or benchmark, which pro-
vides theoretical models); and analytical tools (i.e., statistical
analysis, case studies). He concluded that there is no need to
invent country-specific economics, but application of
current theories could develop unique and country-specific
insights. Yet there is no denying that transformations in
emerging markets present unprecedented challenges to
existing theories. For example, why do some economies
based on the rule of law and private property rights, such as
India, experience a slower pace of economic growth than
some economies in which property rights are less secure,
such as China?
Clearly, Chinese and Indian firms have some distinctive
(and shared) governance traditions (and problems) due to
their histories and the unique challenges they experience as
they transition towards freer markets. For example, years of
socialistic ideology (in India) and communistic ideology (in
China) had led to closed markets and the dominance of the
state in both economies (Huang & Khanna, 2003). However,
there are striking differences in the political, economic, and
cultural dimensions that would exert strong influence on the
development (or lack thereof) of corporate governance in the
two countries.
In terms of the governance environment, which is the set
of political, economic, and social institutions that facilitate or
constrain the choices of governance mechanisms, China is
more relation-based as it lacks a comprehensive rule of law
and has a strong guanxi culture, whereas India is relatively
more rule-based due to its long tradition of English common
law and a democratic political system (Li & Filer, 2007; Li
& Nair, 2007). Another interesting difference is that the
Chinese economic reforms resulted from Mao’s ruinous eco-
nomic policy and thus was internally driven. But the reform
has heavily relied on external resources (e.g., foreign invest-
ment). In contrast, the Indian economic reform was trig-
gered by external events (the Gulf War and the collapse of
the Soviet Union that drastically reduced foreign currency
inflow and trade), but it has primarily relied on internal
resources (Li & Nair, 2007). Understanding these different
origins may help us better understand how corporate gov-
ernance practices are being shaped in the two largest emerg-
ing economies that account for over one-third of the world’s
population.
It is these corporate governance challenges in China and
India, and the impact of reforms on governance that consti-
tuted much of the research that was presented at the sym-
posium. Specifically, the conference revealed the following
issues to be of central interest in the context of corporate
governance in China and India.
The Governance Environment
To carefully delineate the unique approaches to corporate
governance that has evolved in China and India, it is impor-
tant to understand the environments that firms in these
countries are embedded in, and how these environments are
changing. The scope of discussion and research here include
examining the reforms, cultural norms, rule of law, regula-
tions, and role of history. For example, how do accounting
rules in these countries differ from those in mature econo-
mies? Research on environments could also build links to
other issues and their impact on governance practices and
firm performance.
Executives and Directors
Are CEOs and top management behaviors, leadership styles,
compensation norms, selection practices, interpersonal net-
works, unique or different in China and India? How do
these elements influence firm performance? What are the
specific roles of boards of directors? How are board
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members selected and evaluated? What determines board
effectiveness? How effective are the boards?
Stakeholder Management
How do various stakeholders negotiate their rights? How
are powers and influence shifting among various stakehold-
ers? How do institutional investors, NGOs and analysts
influence governance practices? How reliable and transpar-
ent are organizational communication with stakeholders?
Ownership and Control
What is the structure of firm ownership? What is the impact
of state majority and minority ownership on governance?
What are the role of business groups and family ownership
in governance? How do family dynamics influence
governance?
All these questions bear careful scrutiny for corporate
governance in general, and corporate governance in China
and India in particular.
THE SPECIAL ISSUE
The ultimate mission of Corporate Governance: An Interna-
tional Review (CGIR) is to develop a rigorous and relevant
global theory of corporate governance. Since the preponder-
ance of theory and research that we have so far has emanated
from scholars operating in and studying developed econo-
mies, this special issue gives the inter-disciplinary field of
corporate governance a chance to redress some imbalances
and fill some voids. Indeed, while one special issue cannot
address all the issues discussed above, in this volume, we
have attempted to assemble a set of papers that were
undoubtedly representative of the submissions we received,
but also were theoretically grounded, empirically sound and
raised provocative new questions. These papers highlight
the unique governance issues facing China and India, and
use multiple theoretical lenses to interpret and understand
them.
The first two articles in this special issue are comparative
studies of both China and India. In our lead-off article,
“Business group affiliation, firm governance and firm per-
formance: Evidence from China and India,” Singh and Gaur
(2009) use institutional and agency theories to examine cor-
porate governance practices in both China and India. Spe-
cifically, they examine how business group affiliation,
ownership concentration, and board independence affect
firm performance. Using archival data on top 500 Chinese
and Indian firms from multiple data sources for 2007, they
found that group affiliated firms performed worse than
unaffiliated firms, and the negative relationship was stron-
ger in the case of Indian firms than Chinese firms. They also
found that ownership concentration had a positive effect on
firm performance, while board independence had a negative
effect on firm performance. Intriguingly, they found that the
link between group affiliation and firm performance within
a country was moderated by ownership concentration.
In our second article, “CSR communications intensity in
Chinese and Indian multinational companies,” Lattemann,
Fetscherin, Alon, Li, and Schneider (2009) address the
puzzle of why firms in China, which has a higher level of
economic development and thus should communicate more
corporate social responsibility (CSR) according to existing
theories, communicate less than firms in India? They use a
model that includes country-, industry-, and firm-level
factors to predict CSR communications intensity, a proxy for
CSR activities. Using data on the largest multinational com-
panies in China and India, they show that Indian firms com-
municate more CSR primarily due to a more rule-based (as
opposed to relation-based) governance environment. Also,
firms in the manufacturing sector tended to communicate
more CSR than firms in service sectors. Finally, firm-level
characteristics such as size, CEO duality of CEO, and out-
sider representation also were found to have a significant
influence on CSR communications.
The remaining five articles were single-country studies
that focused on corporate governance in China or India. For
example, Shen and Lin (2009) studied the relationships
between firm profitability, state ownership, and top manage-
ment turnover at partially privatized firms through the lens
of behavioral theory of organizational search in their paper,
“Firm profitability, state ownership, and top management
turnover at the listed firms in China: A behavioral perspec-
tive.” They find that firm profitability and state ownership
are negatively related to top management turnover only
when firm profitability is below target (measured by indus-
try median). They also find that top management turnover
has a positive impact on subsequent firm profitability when
it occurs under performance below target, but has a negative
impact when it occurs under performance above target. In
addition, they report that top management turnover under
performance below target has a positive impact on subse-
quent firm profitability when the state is not the largest
shareholder, but has no impact when the state is the largest
shareholder.
In their article entitled “Non-tradable Share Reform and
Corporate Governance in the Chinese Stock Market,” Yeh,
Shu, Lee, and Su (2009) studied agency problems in Chinese
listed firms by examining the tradable and non-tradable
shares, a unique phenomenon during China’s financial
market development that provides a natural experimental
setting to observe how agency problems are embedded in
different classes of ownership. They found that compensation
is positively correlated with non-tradable shares, the pledge
ratio, and related-party transactions; foreign ownership is
negatively associated with compensation. For firms with rela-
tively weak governance or severe agency problems, tradable
shareholders demand higher compensation to compensate
their concerns. However, the effect of these variables reverses
on the ex-post wealth effect of tradable shareholders.
Liu and Lin (2009) examine the association between the
internal corporate governance mechanism of firms and their
auditor switching behavior among the listed firms in China
in their paper titled, “The determinants of auditor switch
from the perspective of corporate governance in China.”
They distinguished between two types of auditor switching–
switching to a larger auditor or switching to a smaller
auditor. They find that to protect and realize opaqueness
gains, firms with weaker corporate governance (higher own-
ership concentration and shared CEOs and Board of Direc-
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tors’ chairmen) generally are more likely to switch to a
smaller auditor rather than to a larger one.
In “Board structure and firm performance: Evidence from
India’s top companies,” Jackling and Johl (2009) studied
how composition of the board, board size, and aspects of
board leadership, including duality and board “busyness,”
impact firm performance within Indian firms. They frame
their paper using agency and resource dependence theories.
They found that outside directors and larger boards have a
role in improving performance, while outside directors with
multiple appointments have a negative impact on perfor-
mance. They also found that CEO power due to duality (or
being a promoter) and board meeting frequency was not
associated with performance.
Finally, Zattoni, Pedersen, and Kumar’s (2009) paper, “The
performance of business group firms during institutional
transition: A longitudinal study of Indian firms,” examined
how reforms led to the dilution of the role of business
groups within India. They use institutional and transaction
cost theories to examine if group affiliated firms outper-
formed unaffiliated firms. Analyzing data from 1990 to 2006
they found that group affiliated firms enjoyed superior per-
formance in the early stages of the reforms, but the perfor-
mance leveled out in the latter phase. They also found that
older group affiliated firms were better able to cope with
institutional transition than younger group affiliated firms,
and found that group affiliated service firms were better able
to cope with institutional transition than group affiliated
manufacturing firms.
SOME PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
Some of the findings presented in the papers in this issue
were consistent with the findings in developed economies;
other results were contradictory. Do Western theories and
findings hold up when applied in the context of China and
India? Do we need uniquely Asian theories to address the
governance issues in China and India? While the papers in
this special issue allow us to begin to answer these ques-
tions, we believe many more questions remain to be asked
and answered. It is clear that some theories – such as the
agency and institutional perspectives – offer useful lenses
with which to view corporate governance practices and
issues across different cultures. However, we also note that
given the unique historical and religious backgrounds, paths
of development, and sheer size of China and India, the pat-
terns of corporate governance and the interrelationships
among the key concepts and relationships may be consider-
ably different from what have been established in existing
theories. If correct, this suggests that contextually rich, new
theory building is required.
Nonetheless, we should also keep in mind that the tran-
sitions in China and India are not isolated; they are part of a
larger global transformation. Thus, many of the governance
issues China and India confront also exist in other emerging
economies, so future theory building and theory testing
studies should aim at discovering patterns that are impor-
tant and generalizable to emerging economies. This special
issue offers a first attempt in testing extant theories, but,
unfortunately, we did not receive many theory-building
studies for the special issue. In particular, the next phase of
research should examine how firms from these countries
influence corporate governance in other countries as they
expand abroad, and it would be interesting and useful to
observe the extent to which corporate governance is similar
within a wider variety of emerging market economies.
As we wrap up this special issue, we want to thank the
Editor-in-Chief, Bill Judge, the Associate Editors, and the
reviewers for their constant support and guidance, for
without their effort, this special issue would not be possible.
Since we each were born and raised in these two countries,
this has been an unusually satisfying endeavor. We
commend this issue for your consideration and research.
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